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The world population boom has aroused great interest in the
academic and popular presses. Not all observers are sure that the
problem is as serious as the number of books and articles on growth
would indicate.' Nevertheless, a consensus has emerged that eventual
stabilization of world population is essential.2  Although the United
States does not suffer from the same intensity of population expansion as
some nations, and its growth rates have now almost reached a point of
stability,' any reasonable world strategy must include attention to popu-
lation gains in this country. Even the non-alarmists on the Commission
on Population Growth and the American Future conclude that stabiliza-
tion of United States population is necessary.4
Federal tax laws take into account many factors that relate to
family size.5  Some of these are obvious. Others may not be. This
t Associate Professor, University of Houston College of Law. A.B. 1958,
Harvard College; LL.B. 1964, Harvard Law School.
1. Among the naysayers are some Third World spokesmen who feel that their
problems arise from reasons other than too many mouths, such as lack of available funds,
limited health services, a shortage of skilled workers, cultural and religious traditions,
and others. See, e.g., Percy, Implementation of the World Population Plan of Action, 10
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 37, 49-50 (1975).
2. The World Population Plan of Action was adopted by the U.N. World
Population Conference at Bucharest in August 1974, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.60/19
(1974), and later by the U.N. Economic and Social Council. U.N. Doc. EDEC/57
(1975). See generally Percy, supra note 1, at 37-39. But see generally K. VONNEOUT,
WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE 27-28 (1968) (envisioning population of 17 billion,
with both birth control and sexual pleasure prohibited).
3. The rate of growth of United States population was about 0.8% in 1974, as
contrasted with 1.2% in 1964. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, No. 75, at 11, table 9 [hereinafter cited
as STAT. ABSTRACT]. Extrapolations made 10 years ago of U.S. population in the year
2000 were on the order of up to 322 million. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS,
Series P-25, No. 493, at 20 (1972); Schaffer & Berman, Tax Exemptions and the Birth-
rate: The Singleminded Approach to Public Policy, 3 ENVT'L AFF. 687, 687 (1974).
See also Dileo, Directions and Dimensions of Population Policy in the United States,
46 TUL. L. REV. 184, 210 (1971).
4. COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE, POPULA-
TION AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
But see Separate Statement of PaulAB. Comely, M.D., in id. at 263.
5. See text accompanying notes 19-46 infra. See also M. HARRIS, BANG THE DRUM
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paper inquires whether existing federal tax laws have encouraged fami-
lies to bear more children, and whether those same laws can be amended
to encourage families to bear fewer children in the future.0 The conclu-
sion is tentative, but affirmative: even so personal a decision as the
one to have children is greatly affected by societal attitudes, and tax laws
can play a substantial part in changing those societal attitudes.
I. BIRTHRATE-THE CRITICAL FACTOR
No one can even list, let alone discuss, in one short article, all of
the factors that influence national population trends. Some of the more
obvious can be noted though. Life expectancy, long a factor in popula-
tion increase, has lost its significance in this country because the trend
toward increased longevity has flattened out.7 Immigration has a sig-
nificant impact upon United States populations but does not affect total
world population.
Apart from life expectancy and immigration, the most visible
factor in population change is birthrate. Birthrate is one of the most
difficult factors to analyze, and it is certainly one of the most politically
delicate to manipulate. Birthrate may be affected by many factors, e.g.,
presence or absence of information about contraceptives, availability of
medical care and availability of abortion. Whatever its influence, tax
law falls low on the list when compared to the other factors listed.
SLOWLY 6 (1956), where the narrator's unborn child is referred to as "600 dollars" (the
amount of the dependency exemption at the time).
6. Among the articles that have considered this question are: Cook, Formulating
Population Policy: A Case Study of the United States, 3 ENVT'L AFF. 47 (1974); Davis,
Population Policy: Will Current Programs Succeed?, 158 SCIENCE 730 (1967); Dileo,
supra note 3; Enke, The Economics of Government Payments to Limit Population, 8
ECON. DEv. & CULTURAL CHANGE 339 (1960); Montgomery, The Population Explosion
and United States Law, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 629 (1971); Moore, Legal Action to Stop
Our Population Explosion, 12 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 314 (1963); Noonan & Dunlap, Un-
intended Consequences: Laws Indirectly Affecting Population Growth in the United
States, in 6 COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE, RE-
SEARCH REPORTS 115 (R. Parks & C. Westoff eds. 1972); Packwood, Incentives for the
Two-Child Family, 6 TRIAL, Aug.-Sept. 1970, at 13; Rabin, Population Control Through
Financial Incentives, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1353 (1972); Schaffer & Berman, supra note 3;
Spengler, Population Problem: In Search of a Solution, 166 SCIENCE 1234 (1969); Note,
Legal Analysis and Population Control: The Problem of Coercion, 84 HARV. L. Rev.
1856 (1971); Comment, Population Policy Making, 42 U.M.-K.C. L. REV. 201 (1973).
7. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 12. See also Pedrick, Larger Bore
Canons of Taxation for Federal Estate and Gift Tax Revision, 54 TAXES 205, 206
(1976) (suggesting that increases in longevity since 1915 were for purposes of estate tax
avoidance). Age distribution has a role in population growth, but it will result in a
flattening out of the population curve eventually. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
4, at 94-95.
8. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 199-201.
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The most important factor affecting a nation's birthrate, however,
may not be among those listed; the most important factor may be
community attitude.9 And a country's attitude toward birthrate and
family size is shaped by many things. A manifestation of this country's
attitude is the fact that parents of large families still receive applause
from a studio audience when a master of ceremonies elicits the number
of children.10 Tax laws also applaud large families and reward them
with tax reductions that have both symbolic value and financial benefit.
Just as a country's tax laws are a product of the country's attitudes, they
help shape the country's attitudes. And as long as they applaud the
large family, they act as an incentive for more births.
Sometimes tax laws offer direct applause, as with the dependency
exemption. Often, however, the influence is so subtle as to pass largely
unnoticed. Consider the case of "working wives." One cause of the
decline in birthrate in this country has been an increase in the number of
working wives." Their entry into the job market has been necessitated
by higher family costs for housing, food and transportation, not by a
desire to have fewer children.' 2 But one is less likely to have a large
family if one is expected to be a significant wage earner for that family,
and working wives do, in fact, have fewer children than non-working
wives.' Tax policies that encourage wives to work would tend to
reduce the birthrate. Tax policies that discourage wives from working
would tend to increase the birthrate. Tax policies that make it easier
for working wives to have children would also tend to increase the
birthrate by reducing the effect of the "working wives" factor.
Current tax laws combine with economic factors to mitigate the
population-reducing influence of working wives. Years of political
activity for women's liberation have not brought women's income up to
the level of men's. The proportionate contribution of working wives to
family income is, in fact, declining.' 4  As inflation causes nominal
9. Individual attitudes are important. Women of childbearing age who are
concerned about population growth intend to have on the average significantly fewer
additional children than those not concerned. Rindfuss, Recent Trends in Population
Attitudes, in 6 COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE,
RESEARcH REPORTS 465, 467 (R. Parks & C. Westoff eds. 1972).
10. See Richard Heffner Associates, Inc., American Network Television's Popula-
tion Content: Spring 1971, in id. at 515, 517.
11. STAT. ABSTRACT, supra note 3, at 346, table 563.
12. Id. at xvii.
13. See Westoff, Population and the Family: Overview, in 2 THE POPULATION
DEBATE: DIMENSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 316, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.60/SYM.II/l1
(1975) (Papers of the World Population Conference, Bucharest, 1974).
14. STAT. ABSTRACT, supra note 3, at 397, table 648.
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income to go up, progressive income tax rates begin to reduce the value
of the wife's financial contribution, and the benefit derived by working
wives may go from marginal to negative. 15
The "working wives" thesis is even more complicated. It is be-
coming easier for wives to work and to have as many children as they
want.' 6 Inclusion of maternity leave in general health care insurance
programs as a fringe benefit makes pregnancy a much less costly
prospect. Child care is developing into a positive benefit, with "head-
start" educational potential. Again, income tax law and policy are
involved. Medical insurance premiums are tax deductible.'1  Child
care costs are deductible.' 8 But does child care for working mothers
influence them to have more children or fewer children? Arguably, if
child care is available and encouraged, even subsidized by the tax laws,
the mother of one child can go back to work and not be left at home to
undertake continued active childbearing.
Enough has been said to point up the intricate relationship between
tax laws and birthrate. It is now time to look more carefully at some of
the specific provisions that may affect birthrate and family size deci-
sions.
II. THE PRO-NATALIST STRUCTURE OF THE
PRESENT TAX LAW
Present federal tax laws encourage population growth by providing
subsidies to families with children. This policy does not reflect deliber-
ate choice, but instead is a product of a series of decisions, discretely
made, each of which has had as an unstated premise the desirability (or
at least acceptance) of high birthrates.
A. The Dependency Exemption
The most direct pro-natalist provision of United States tax law is
15. See Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389,
1431-33 (1975). See also Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of
Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 49 (1972).
16. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory
maternity leave for school teachers violates due process). But maternity payments need
not be available under general health care insurance programs. See General Elec. Co. v,
Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
17. I.R.C. § 213 (a) (2).
18. I.R.C. § 44A (Tax Reform Act of 1976); see text accompanying notes 30-33
infra. But note the Treasury position that the fair market value of employer-furnished
child care facilities constitutes gross income to the employee-parent. Discussion Draft
of Proposed Treasury Regulations § 1.61-16(f), example 19, [1975] 7 FED. TAXEs (P-
H) If 65,668.13 (withdrawn).
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the dependency exemption. The taxpayer is allowed under current law
to subtract $750 for each dependent from income before tax is calcu-
lated."" The more dependents, the lower the tax.
The first post-sixteenth amendment income tax law did not have a
dependency exemption." The exemption originated in the Revenue
Act of 1917, which set the dollar amount at $200.21 In keeping with a
general upward movement in the amount, the Tax Reform Act of 1969
provided a series of increases in the personal exemption that (with
subsequent legislative modification) has resulted in the present $750
exemption per dependent. 2 President Carter, however, may seek to
replace the exemption with a tax credit.2
3
The reason for the exemption and its increase was described in the
House Report to the Revenue Act of 1921 in these terms: "The equity
of these increased exemptions is self-evident. It relieves the taxpayers
least able to bear tax burdens."24  The House Report points up an
essential problem. What was passed as a measure to provide progres-
sivity in the income tax and to exclude the poor from taxation25 has the
symbolic effect of encouraging children without limitation.
B. Joint Return Rates
Single taxpayers pay taxes at an established rate, and the tax rate
increases as the income goes up. Married taxpayers were traditionally
able to avoid higher rates by income splitting, i.e., the income for
marriage partners is split and half is allocated to each. Until 1969, a
single person who earned $40,000 per year could have reduced his or
her tax rate substantially by marrying a non-working spouse. After
marriage, both marriage partners would have been taxed as if they had
separate $20,000 incomes. 6
Any policy that encourages marriage is likely to have the compan-
ion effect of encouraging childbirth. Moreover, the tax advantages of
19. I.R.C. §§ 1, 61, 63, 151(e). Section 63 defines taxable income (upon which a
tax computed pursuant to the rate schedules of section 1 is arrived at) as gross income
(section 61) less deductions, including the section 151 dependency exemption.
20. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 7(a), 39 Stat. 761.
21. Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1203(I), 40 Stat. 300.
22. I.R.C. § 151(b). See also Bittker, supra note 15, at 1444.
23. TIME, Feb. 21, 1977, at 66. President Ford had proposed a $1,000 exemption.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1976, § A, at 20, col. 2.
24. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2)
C.B. 168, 173.
25. See Schaffer & Berman, supra note 3, at 691-93.
26. This was changed by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 to a system of rate schedules
whereby single taxpayers pay no more than 20% more than a married couple with the
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joint filing are greatest when only one marriage partner earns income.
This is usually the husband. If the other marriage partner (the wife)
works, the advantages of income splitting decrease. As the wife begins
to earn the same income as the husband, the advantages of income
splitting disappear and may even become negative.27 Thus, the tax rate
system offers a financial incentive for couples to marry and a disincen-
tive for the wife to work-a situation likely to produce children.
C. Head of Household
Arguably, tax laws even encourage unmarried women to have
children. Current tax rates for "head of household" taxpayers are lower
than those for single persons.28  A single person can qualify as head of
household by having a child or other dependent live with him or her.29
If child-bearing decisions were made for purely financial reasons, a
tongue-in-cheek argument could be made that a single woman would be
encouraged to have an illegitimate child to get a lower tax rate. That
reasoning would not carry to a later child, because additional births do
not result in additional benefits under the head of household provision.
D. Tax Credit for Dependents
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 added a $30 tax credit for each
exemption, including dependents. This was increased to $35 by the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, which also allows, alternatively, a general tax
credit of two percent of income (up to a maximum credit of $180).
Taxpayers claiming more than five exemptions get more credit than
those with more than $9,000 of income who claim fewer exemptions.3 0
The earned income credit introduced by the Tax Reduction Act of
1975 added another theoretical encouragement for child-bearing. It is
a credit of ten percent of income up to $4,00031 that is phased out when
income reaches $8,000.32 To qualify for the credit, a taxpayer must
have a dependent child. 3
same income. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 801-803, 83 Stat. 487,
675 (codified at I.R.C. § 1).
27. I.R.C. § 1(a), (c), (d); see Bittker, supra note 15, at 1429-31.
28. I.R.C. §§ I(b) & 2(b).
29. Id. § 2(b)(1)(A).
30. Id. § 42(a)(1).
31. Id. § 43(a)(1).
32. Id. § 43(b)(1).
33. Id. § 43(c)(1).
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The influence of either of these provisions on actual child-bearing
decisions is probably nil. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Congress
in a tax reduction effort uses strategies that reinforce the policy that
applauds the large family.
E. Deductions for Child Care
The complexities of the child care deduction have been mentioned
in the introduction, and it is not clear whether the overall impact is
positive or negative on childbearing. Arguably, if child care costs were
not deductible, working parents would face increased costs with each
child and would be discouraged from childbearing. Present tax law
eases the burden.
The child care provision came into the Code in 1954 3 after
taxpayers unsuccessfully attempted to deduct the costs of raising chil-
dren as a business expense3" and as a medical deduction.3 6 The 1954
provision allowed a $600 deduction. This was increased to $900 in
1966 and to $4,800 in 1971. In 1976, the child care provision was
converted to a credit, equivalent to a $4,000 deduction at twenty percent
marginal rates.37
F. Incentives for the Rich
The income tax laws offer subtle incentives for affluent familes to
have children. For example, it is possible for a faxpayer to assign some
income within his or her family to reduce the tax rate on such income. If
a parent receives investment income that is taxed at seventy percent, a
substantial tax saving can be achieved by shifting the income to other
members of the family.3 The more children a family has, the more
opportunities there are for attempting such shifting.39
Federal estate and gift tax policy also encourages an affluent family
to have more children. Gifts may be made within a family unit, with a
34. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36 (1954).
35. Mildred A. O'Connor, 6 T.C. 323 (1946).
36. See, e.g., Ochs v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1952).
37. The original child care deduction section 214 was replaced by new section 44A
of the Internal Revenue Code.
38. However, use of the standard deduction is not available for dependent chil-
dren's investment income. I.R.C. § 141(e). Earned income is taxable to the child, even
if the parent is entitled to it as a matter of law. I.R.C. § 73(a).
39. But see Tinkoff v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1941), in which use
of a family partnership of which a newly born child was a member for income shifting
was disallowed.
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* donor allowed a $3,000 per donee exclusion from the gift tax.4" More-
over, generation-skipping trusts may be excluded from the chapter 13
tax in the amount of $250,000 per child.4 And the orphan's exclusion
from the estate tax may be available, based upon the number of minor
children of the decedent multiplied by the number of years each has to
reach the age of twenty-one.42
G. Home Ownership Deductions
In addition to direct tax benefits accruing to families with children,
tax law subsidizes a substantial portion of the cost of owner-occupied
housing. Such housing is undoubtedly conducive to large families. The
home mortgage interest and taxes deductions" have encouraged Ameri-
cans to become the most over-housed people in the world." The
allowance of deductions for interest and taxes paid by homeowners,
coupled with government refusal to tax the fair rental value of owner-
occupied housing as imputed income,45 has discouraged apartment con-
struction and has led to construction of larger houses occupied by
taxpayers.46  Based upon Parkinson's third law, empty houses tend to
become filled with children and the population boom is further acceler-
ated.
It may readily and convincingly be argued that childbearing deci-
sions are not made after potential parents read the tax law. But the
overall emphasis upon family size as a tax reducing measure undoubted-
ly adds to the attitudinal acceptance of large families.
III. A LOOK AT SOME PROPOSED CHANGES
This article does not deal with a new topic. Many articles have
been written that link economic considerations with the population
boom. Many recommendations for change have been made. Admitting
40. I.R.C. § 2503(b).
41. Id. § 2613(a)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6).
42. Id. § 2057.
43. Id. §§ 163(a), 164(a)(1). The tax dollar costs of these deductions were
estimated at $6.5 billion and $5.27 billion, respectively, for 1976. H.R. REP. No. 94-
145, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1975).
44. This has resulted in a 20.4% to 34.8% overinvestment in housing, varying with
income class. A. HARBERGER & M. BAILEY, THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL
60-63 (1969). See also Aaron, Income Taxes and Housing, 60 AM. EcON. REV. 789
(1970).
45. See Marsh, The Taxation of Imputed Income, 58 POL. SCI. Q. 514 (1943).
46. See id. at 517, 536; cf. Barnett, The Constitutionality of Selected Fertility Con-
trol Policies, 55 N.C.L. Rev. 357, 374-78 (1977) (constitutionality of limiting housing
space).
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the pro-natalist bias of United States tax laws, an observer may be
properly skeptical about some proposals that have been made to limit
population growth. Some fine screening is in order.
A. General Approach
Proponents of birth limitations advocate strategies that range from
downright coercive to voluntary. At the coercive extreme, laws have
been suggested that would prohibit families from having more than two
children,41 the number commonly regarded as falling below the critical
mass of population explosion. This method is not likely to find political
acceptability unless there is complete agreement about failure of other
birth limitation methods.48 Purely voluntary strategies, such as greater
access to birth control and abortion, are now being implemented. 49 Most
strategists recognize the legitimacy of economic incentives to influence
birthrate.50 Economic incentives, including tax law changes, fall be-
tween the extremes of pure coercion and pure voluntarism.
B. Pohlman's Plan
Among the proposed economic carrots are cash bonuses for steri-
lization,8 ' which is a fundamental aspect of foreign population control
techniques, at least for underdeveloped countries.52  Edward Pohlman
suggests a less coercive (or less irreversible) bonus plan for non-
pregnancy. Pohlman's plan would provide women with a small bonus
for each month of non-pregnancy, with a large bonus for completing a
prescribed number of years with no births.5 3
C. Spengler's Suggestion
Economics professor Joseph Spengler notes that children are often
viewed as a means for support of parents in old age. He therefore
47. Comment, Population: The Problem, the Constitution and a Proposal, 11 J.
FAM. L. 319 (1971).
48. See Schaffer & Berman, supra note 3, at 689.
49. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 167-78.
50. See articles cited note 6 supra.
51. E. POHLMAN, How To KILL PoPuLATON 67 (1971); see E. Pohlman, Incen-
tives and Compensations in Birth Planning 53 (1971) (monograph 11, UNC-CH
Population Center).
52. See, e.g., E. Pohlman, Incentives, supra note 46, at 1-2. See also Warwick,
Ethics and Population Control in Developing Countries, 4 HASTINGs CENrur REP., June
1974, at 1, 3.
53. E. POHLMAN, How TO KILL POPULAnTON 98, 99, 105-06 (1971).
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suggests a social security system to be financed by proportional contri-
butions from income (much as the American social security system is),
with benefits payable only to those parents with fewer surviving children
than the replacement number of births under existing mortality condi-
tions.54  (For the United States, that number would be slightly over
two.) Spengler feels it essential that the system reward beneficiaries
highly.
D. Calabresi's Market System
Yale professor Guido Calabresi formulated a market system for
limiting childbirth.55 He would allow each couple to place a value upon
additional children in a system of sliding scale incentives and disincen-
tives. The cash subsidy for low income families not having children
would shift toward progressively increasing taxes for high income fami-
lies that have additional children. The levels of such subsidies and
taxes would be set at societally determined levels in order to achieve
replacement fertility. This would result in a tradeoff of material bene-
fits for extra children.
Calabresi's Yale colleague, Boris Bittker, on the other hand, writes
that some view children as just another consumer good that ought to be
paid for by the parents. 56 If a system of pure bidding for additional
children were allowed, presumably the wealthy would snap up all the
children, and the poor would be excessively penalized. Moreover, if the
rich set the fashion and if the fashion were to have children, lower
income families might demand that they be allowed to participate.",
Any economic system that places its primary impact upon the poor of
the nation and denies them choice may raise serious constitutional
issues. Certainly, the current level of black sensitivity to such proposals
would make such an approach politically unacceptable. Bonus systems
in general are subject to the criticism that, whatever their practicality
and "microeconomic elegance," they are quixotic, because of the sup-
position that if America ever redistributes wealth so radically, it will not
be for population control.58
54. Spengler, supra note 6, at 1237.
55. Calebresi's plan is reported in Note, Legal Analysis and Population Control, 84
HAav. L REV. 1856, 1904-06 (1971).
56. Bittker, supra note 15, at 1445-47.
57. Analysis of statistics by income level and by educational level does not
demonstrate such a trickle-down effect whereby shifts at upper levels are followed by
shifts in lower levels. The data seem to indicate that childbirth rates shift in tandem for
upper and lower levels. It is felt, however, that fashions are set by "leaders" and the rest
of the potentially childbearing population takes its attitudes from the leaders.
58. See Schaffer & Berman, supra note 3, at 701.
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After wandering imaginatively through the fantasy world of "what
if," proponents of population control eventually return to the tax system
as a handy device for limiting the number of births and join population
popularizers Garrett Hardin 9 and Paul Erlich6" in calling for changes in
the tax laws to limit childbirth.
E. Specific Assaults on the Tax Laws
A recent article advocates allowing unmarried couples the income
splitting benefits of joint return filing. 61 One may guess that couples
living together as unmarried partners are less inclined to procreate than
if vows had been taken.
Writers usually single out the dependency exemption for criticism
because it specifically and blatantly deals with children. This exemp-
tion drew attention before the current alarm about the population crisis
judging from the comment that "[eIven before the advent of the Pill, it
was argued that couples who preferred action to abstinence should not
be rewarded by the Treasury." 62
A well-publicized proposal introduced by Senator Packwood in
1970 would limit each family to two exemptions for children with
exceptions for uncontrollable circumstances such as multiple births.6
Packwood saw the bill as a symbolic measure that would probably have
little or no effect on couples desiring children, but would put the United
States government on record as supporting a "positive commitment to
population stability." There is some dispute as to how merely symbolic
such a plan would be. Schaffer and Berman discuss the plan at some
length and conclude it could have enormous effect. 64 They estimate the
undiscounted value of each exemption as roughly five percent of the cost
of raising the child. This is comparable to the historical investment
credit of seven percent on some types of machinery. 65  If Senator
59. See, e.g., Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
60. See, e.g., P. EHRLiCH, THE PoPuLATIoN BOMB 131-32 (rev. ed. 1971).
61. Cook, Formulating Population Policy, 3 ENVT'L AFF. 47, 66 & n.71 (1974)
(discussing S. 898, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), introduced by Senator Ribicoff).
62. Bittker, supra note 15, at 1446.
63. S. 3632, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), discussed in Packwood, Incentives for the
Two-Child Family, 6 TRIAL, Aug.-Sept. 1970, at 13.
64. Schaffer & Berman, supra note 3, at 691. The direct undiscounted cost of
raising a child through college as of 1969 was estimated at a moderate level of $39,924
in Reed & McIntosh, Costs of Children, in 2 COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH AND
THE AMERICAN FUTruRE, RESEARCH REPORTS 337, 341 (1972). The direct cost of raising
a child in somewhat better circumstances was once estimated at $65,251.13. G. TRU-
DEAU, THE DOONESBURY CHmONICLES 40 (1975).
65. I.R.C. § 46(a)(1)(C).
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Packwood's proposed change caused one wife in ten to have one less
child, five million births would be prevented by the year 2000.0 A
major criticism of the Packwood plan is that it has regressive tax impact.
A family with four children and an income of $10,000 would have an
increase in income tax of $285, or 2.85% of income. The same family
of four with the good fortune to be at the $100,000 level would find its
bill increased by $900, or 0.9% of income.6 7
Operating under the theory that a limit of two exemptions is too
weak a plan, Edward Rabin has suggested eliminating the dependency
exemption altogether and adding a tax surcharge for each child. His
mechanics call for a charge of ten percent of normal income tax for the
first child and five percent for each child thereafter. A one child family
that pays a normal tax of $1,000 would pay $1,100; with two children it
would pay $1,150, etc. The larger surcharge on the first child and
continuing surcharge on additional children would presumably have
the maximum effect on population growth by affecting one, two and
three child families as well as the "culpable" family that has four or
more. The goal would be to encourage couples to delay having chil-
dren, thus preventing births by putting some couples past the childbear-
ing age. An increase in childless and single-child couples should offset
the population effect of the inevitable three or more child family.08 The
criticism of the plan is that it would not place the heaviest burden on the
rich since the birth charge would not depend on disposable income
amount, but on the type of income a taxpayer held. A taxpayer who
holds tax-exempt municipal bonds would feel no effect from the sur-
charge, and one who has long term capital gains would feel only a
diluted effect.6 9
Alternative ideas for juggling the exemption abound. Some writ-
ers have suggested the exemption should be done away with outright.7 0
This would produce a tax structure similar to that of Denmark with
regard to children, albeit without the accompanying government support
allowance. 71 Rabin suggests a compromise: no exemptions for the first
three children and small ones for the fourth and subsequent children.72
66. Schaffer & Berman, supra note 3, at 691.
67. Id. at 693.
68. Rabin, supra note 6, at 1370.
69. Schaffer & Berman, supra note 3, at 696.
70. E.g., Rabin, supra note 6, at 1368.
71. See Koch-Nielson, Schmidt & Ussing, Law and Fertility in Denmark, in 1 LAW
AND FERTILI IN EUROPE 199, 207, 210 (M. Kirk, M. Livi Bacci & E. Szabady eds.
1972).
72. Rabin, supra note 6, at 1368-69.
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This represents an attempt at control and tax equity. It takes
into account the fact that large families are less able to pay tax. Yet it
deters births: who is going to climb three trees to get a bite at a small
apple in the fourth?73 Another solution would grant a large, double
exemption for the first child, none for the second and regular exemp-
tions for the third and fourth. Every couple could have their first child,
but with the second, they're on their own.74 The problems, according to
the authors, are that the system represents a windfall to the one child
family that has lower costs than the family with two children and that it
would cost the Treasury at least a billion dollars a year in revenue.75
One final parting shot is offered by Boris Bittker: let's be honest
and admit we're penalizing the culpable parent:
Perhaps the dependency allowance, at least for children, is more
important as a symbol of national policy than as an influence on the
birth rate. If so, denial of the deduction for a year or two after
the birth of an "excess" child may be symbol enough, and if -the
allowance might thereafter be restored to the antisocial parents
in order to measure their tax paying capacity more adequately.
After all, even convicted criminals get some of their civil rights back
after they have paid their debt to society.76
Although I suspect a tongue firmly implanted within a cheek, there is
some merit to the proposal. After all, once the taxpayer has been hit
between the eyes with the new system, is there any need to make the
family continue forever with a reduced standard of living? The pro-
posal has the appeal of causing a minimal amount of symbolic annoyance
to childbearers without any real dislocation of the present tax structure.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF ANTI-NATALIST PROPOSALS
Present federal tax laws are pro-natalist in nature. This was not,
however, the result of deliberate design; they just worked out that way.
The question now is whether deliberate anti-natalist amendments to the
tax laws would survive constitutional challenge. This question goes
beyond whether a Code originally written without pro-natalist provisions
would be constitutional; it clearly would. The reason for the difficulty
is that anti-natalist changes would not merely "happen"; they would be
deliberately injected for population-limiting motivations. The very
73. Id.
74. Schaffer & Berman, supra note 3, at 697-98.
75. Id.
76. Bittker, supra note 15, at 1449.
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deliberateness adds a dimension of constitutional challenge that does not
apply to results that "just happened."
Constitutional challenges would vary, depending upon the particu-
lar anti-natalist strategy adopted. All strategies, however, are subject to
two basic questions: (1) how far, generally, can Congress intrude into
what are traditionally state functions and matters for individual discre-
tion; and (2) how far, specifically, can Congress go by means of its
taxing and spending powers of the Constitution?
A. The Fundamental Documents
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power
to tax and spend for the public welfare. The sixteenth amendment
specifically authorizes Congress to impose an income tax without having
to apportion it among the various states, as was thought to be required
by article I, section 2. Congress has virtually unlimited power to
regulate business activities under the commerce clause. In dealing with
individual rights, Congress has substantial power to pass laws imple-
menting the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment.
As one might expect, there is no constitutional provision specifi-
cally granting Congress power to control family size. To the contrary,
family law has long been almost exclusively a matter of state concern.
Some ingenious arguments have been made that Congress has sufficient
power to regulate family size by implication from the commerce clause
and from its power to enforce the equal protection and due process
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 7  Even if the Supreme Court
were to accept such arguments, it is probable that Congress would feel
uncertain about its power to control births under the commerce clause
or its power to limit individual freedom to procreate under the four-
teenth amendment.78
The taxing authority contained in article I, section 8 requires that
direct or per capita taxes, which are not income taxes, be apportioned
among the states. (Therefore, a federal poll tax would be unconstitu-
tional.) Arguably, the various exemption and surtax proposals would
amount to a direct per capita tax based upon the number of people in a
77. See Montgomery, supra note 6, at 634; Rabin, supra note 6, at 1372-90;
Comment, supra note 6, at 205-09.
78. CI. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERUALS ON CONSTTUTIONAL LAW 211-17 (9th
ed. 1975) (senatorial debate on relative merits of supporting civil rights legislation on
the basis of the commerce clause or the fourteenth amendment).
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family. One writer, however, concludes that they are not capitation
taxes because they are levied without regard to circumstance.7 9
B. The Power of the Sixteenth Amendment
The modem income tax is specifically authorized by the sixteenth
amendment. This amendment was passed after Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co."' held the income tax of 1894 unconstitutional on the
ground that Congress did not have power to impose a direct tax without
apportionment among the states. The amendment states that "Congress
shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment. . ....
Congress has used its sixteenth amendment power extensively,
establishing an enormously complicated taxing system. There have
been few successful constitutional challenges to specific tax provisions. 1
To the extent that the amendment conflicts with earlier constitutional
provisions, the amendment would prevail as the later fundamental state-
ment. Accordingly, unless there is some feature of a tax revision that
goes beyond a mere tax on income, it should withstand challenge.
Congress has used the tax laws to accomplish certain policy goals.
Tax laws have been used, for example, to stimulate small political
contributions.8 2  These tax incentives did not "just happen"; they were
the product of conscious decision. Yet, no one seriously suggests that
they are unconstitutional.
C. The "Penalty" Problem Cases
It is clear that Congress could regulate by taxation any activity that
it could regulate directly. But there is a definite limitation on the
regulatory power: Congress could not exact a penalty in the guise of a
tax, and the Court would invalidate such "mere pretexts" if Congress
attempted to regulate what it could not control otherwise. 83
The limitation is spelled out in the Child Labor Tax Case. 4
Congress in 1916 had tried to regulate child labor, and the Court had
79. Rabin, supra note 6, at 1381.
80. 157 U.S. 429, on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
81. Among the few cases in which an income tax provision was held unconstitu-
tional is Moritz v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972) (1966 version of § 214
held unconstitutional as applied to single men who had never married).
82. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 41 & 218.
83. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 78, at 230-42.
84. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 36 (1922).
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declared the effort unconstitutional."5 Congress then passed a tax
measure that imposed punitive taxes upon companies using child labor.
The Court held that the tax was really a penalty designed to coerce
states to do congressional bidding in a matter that was completely the
business of the state government and declared the tax to be unconstitu-
tional. The Court admitted that tax measures could have legitimate
regulatory consequences, but required a reasonable and substantial con-
nection with the raising of revenue. If a revenue goal were present, the
regulatory impact could be viewed as incidental. This principle was
applied in United States v. Constantine,0 striking down a federal excise
tax levied on a violator of state liquor law.
The "mere pretext" doctrine retains some validity, but the Court
has preferred a deferential treatment of congressional tax measures. The
current view is that if a measure produces revenue, it is a tax measure
and within congressional authority. 7  The gambling tax in United
States v. Kahriger 8 and the marijuana tax in Minor v. United States 9
were upheld despite the traditional view that these matters lay in the
states' bailiwick. Although the federal taxes on gambling and mari-
juana had clear regulatory aims, they raise less troubling constitutional
issues than would a tax on children. The activities regulated in Kahri-
ger and Minor are assumed to have little or no redeeming social value,
and therefore they enjoy no constitutional protection." Likewise, such
federal tax laws usually help in enforcement of existing state laws, and
the result is state-national cooperation, not antagonism. In view of
longstanding pro-natal policies of states,91 it is hard to foresee such a
cooperative milieu for a population tax measure.
D. Individual Rights-Tax Law Too Close to the Bedroom
If the Court places any major roadblock in the path of congres-
sional action, it will probably be based on protection of individual
rights. Any member of Congress engaged in soul searching over a
prospective bill must look at the language the Court is using and the
signals it is giving. A member of Congress may also assume that there
85. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
86. 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935).
87. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953) (gambling tax); Sonzinsky
v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937) (firearms tax).
88. 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
89. 396 U.S. 87 (1969).
90. See Rabin, supra note 6, at 1383.
91. See Cook, supra note 6, at 56.
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will be substantial parallel treatment of state action under the fourteenth
amendment and federal action as limited by the fifth amendment.
The fourteenth amendment rights of individuals are usually dis-
cussed in terms of due process "fundamental fights," equal protection
from "invidious classifications" and equal protection of "fundamental
interests." The criteria for evaluating the validity of any measure under
the first two of these were quoted by Justice Goldberg, thus: "'Where
there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may
prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling'
. . . . The law must be shown 'necessary, and not merely rationally
related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy.' "92
One could say that the due process and equal protection analyses
have merged under the Burger court 3 The difference lies only in the
identity of the plaintiff: a member of the general public would com-
plain that his or her fundamental right of marital privacy94 or just plain
personal privacy95 has been unnecessarily violated, whereas a member of
a group defined by race, sex or national origin would complain that his
or her group has been singled out for unequal treatment in violation of
the equal protection clause.9 6 If the measure should be valid under
both these analyses, a member of a fourth group, the poor, might argue
an invidious classification based upon economic status and a violation of
equal protection of a fundamental interest.9 7
The Court has never decided whether family size or the right to
determine family size is a fundamental right under the fourteenth
amendment. There is instead a collision of dicta from Justice Gold-
berg's opinion in Griswold, speaking of "such totalitarian limitation of
family size,"9 8 and from Justice Blackmun's in Graham v. Richardson,99
saying, "the classification involved in that case [Dandridge v. Williams]
(family size) neither impinged on a fundamental constitutional right
nor employed an inherently suspect criterion."'00  One can only guess
whether Blackmun meant that no right was involved or that there was
just no infringement of a right.
92. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (concurring opinion)
(citations omitted).
93. See, e.g., the Rehnquist dissent in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973).
94. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
95. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
96. E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973),
97. Cf. Harper v. Virginia Rd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax).
98. 381 U.S. at 497 (concurring opinion).
99. 403 U.S. 365 (1961) (majority opinion).
100. Id. at 373.
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If the fourteenth amendment issue is one of "fundamental interest,"
the test for validity is less strict. The accepted standard is whether the
action has been "reasonably taken in pursuit of vital state objectives that
cannot be served equally well in significantly less burdensome ways."' 01
A fair assessment of the extent to which the Court will protect the
individual's fundamental interest would be that, while the Court will not
enforce absolute equality, it will enforce some basic minimum rights.'02
The main advantage of tax incentives or disincentives is that they can be
formulated to represent this minimum intrusion and allow at least
minimal leeway for individual preferences.
It must be recognized that fourteenth amendment cases are not
fifth amendment cases. In the civil liberties area, the Court has looked
somewhat more suspiciously at state activity than at federal activity.
Nevertheless, the Court has the same power to strike down federal
action that it has to strike down state action. In many fourteenth
amendment cases, the Court had to sift through the state action to find a
real motive. If Congress decides to use tax or other economic incentives
to influence the birthrate, it is likely that the goal will be fully debated
and recorded. A federal record thus may lack the fog cover that could
otherwise allow the Court to give the measure a safe presumption and
regard the bedroom impact as incidental. Thus, in Dandridge v. Wil-
liams,'"3 the Court upheld a state-imposed maximum limit on welfare
grants that would discourage a recipient family from having additional
children. Although the statute itself did not disclose an intent to limit
family size, no observer could avoid speculation that this goal was
certainly in the minds of many legislators who voted for the measure.
While the present Court will not declare a law unconstitutional solely
because of the motivations of its sponsors,104 the Court in the past has
found improperly motivated legislative actions unconstitutional?'0
E. Necessity
The Japanese exclusion cases of World War II'0 may offer some
101. American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974).
102. Compare San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
with Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
103. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
104. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971).
105. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964) (school closing);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (city annexation). See Brest,
Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. Rnv. 1, 26-27
(1976).
106. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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insight on the doctrine of necessity. They establish that when the
interest is compelling the government may use the means necessary to
accomplish its goal. But governmental intrusion must not exceed the
minimum control necessary. Thus, a curfew was upheld in Hirabayashi
and an order to report to a government center was upheld in Korematsu.
But detention of an individual was construed to be outside the execu-
tive power and presumably totally unacceptable, in Endo. While
these cases may be aberrational, their doctrine remains.
The Court's perception of the intensity of the population problem
is bound to affect its decision. If a potential disaster is perceived from
overpopulation, the Court will uphold measures it would not approve if
only slight inconvenience is perceived as the problem. Removal of
preferences for childbearing persons will probably not cause any consti-
tutional problems, nor will equalizing of tax rates to give essentially the
same preferences to people who do not have children. Providing tax
penalties for persons who do have children will not cause as much
trouble to the Court as laws that strictly limit the number of births per
family.
F. The Particular Impact on Poor Families and Racial Minorities
The emotional appeal for the current system is that people with
children are not likely to get paid more than their co-workers without
children, and it takes more for a family of five to live than for a family
of two. Equal taxation would hurt the large family that has less
spending money. And no one wants an anti-natalist policy to succeed
totally; that would wipe out the human race.
The end product of a tax-based program, according to what has
been considered to this point, would be financial disincentives that
would discourage middle income families from having children. The
affluent can afford the price and would not be deterred. Very low
income families probably do not have general awareness of the financial
implications of such basic acts and are unlikely to be affected one way
or another. But they may be subjected to financial hardship, even
punishment, if they procreate. Only the middle income families are
likely to have the ability to analyze additional childbirths in terms of
financial consequences. The net result could be that no change in
birthrate would be noted among the poor, but they would be punished
after the fact by economic sanction.
Racial minority groups make up a disproportionate percentage of
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low income families.' 07 Some black leaders see some political advan-
tage in an increased black birthrate that may eventually give that group
greater voting strength.' Arguments could certainly be made that
anti-natalist taxation policies that either punish low income families for
having children or discourage them from having children discriminate
unjustly against minorities.
G. A Role for Congress and Its Conscience
Congress, with the legitimate intent of equalizing cost burdens of
children on the government, might establish an excise tax on having
children. This would have some regulatory effect on family size. Chil-
dren cost money, to the country as well as to the taxpayer. If Congress
were to let the costs fall where they originate, there is no constitutional
problem. But if Congress attempts directly to regulate family size, it is
getting on shaky ground, and even minimally intrusive measures through
tax laws should be suspect.
The foregoing discussion assumes that a measure has first passed
the congressional test of constitutionality. The first evaluator of the
validity of any act must always be Congress. The Court serves as a
backstop to catch gross deviations that slip through the congressional
net. 9 Individual legislators must look to their own consciences.
Congress should set a tougher test than the Court demands as a
minimum. For example, the Court would find no racial classification
in a tax that effectively regulated births only among the poor: there
just is not a close enough statistical correlation between race and wealth
to warrant equal protection treatment."x 0 Congress on the other hand
cannot ignore certain facts of life. Black median income is substantially
lower than white, and on the whole, as a percentage of white median
income, has fallen in the years 1970-1974."'1 This corresponds with a
lower, though improving, average level of education attained and hence
a lower expected income throughout life." 2 It adds up to the fact that
107. STAT. ABSTRACT, supra note 3, at 396, table 646.
108. Also, many black leaders view population control programs as a form of
"genocide" directed at minority groups. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 108-11.
109. See Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975).
110. Cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 545-49 (1972) (payment of lower
percentage of need in AFDC program than in other welfare programs does not violate
equal protection, even though more minorities participate in AFDC).
111. STAT. ABSTRACT, supra note 3, at 390, table 631.
112. See id. at 119, table 192.
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blacks would be disproportionately affected if the main impact of a tax
were placed on the lower economic groups.113 There is a significant
equal protection problem in that result whether the Court says so or not.
In the eyes of the average American, there is also a due process
problem: the public sees the right to determine family size as a
fundamental right whether the Court does or not." 4  And the Ameri-
can public has voluntarily gone a long way toward solving the popula-
tion problem, so the public may well doubt the overriding necessity of
government action.
Finally, there is an argument that is neither fish nor fowl: the
inertia syndrome.1 5 The present system and policy behind it have
taken on a quasi-constitutional status. Violation of these unwritten
constitutional provisions can probably raise as much furor as did the
1937 Court-packing crisis. Nominating conventions, the Sherman An-
titrust Act and the dependency exemption are as firmly ensconced as the
right to bear arms. Congress long ago decided on exemptions in order
to avoid squeezing blood from turnips. The low income family, a
sliding scale group determined by a matrix of family size and income
factors, is kept out of the tax structure as a matter of equity and the
practical difficulty of collection." 8 If a tax incentive is to have some
effect, this deeply entrenched policy will probably have to be uprooted.
V. A MODEST PROPOSAL
The glitter of most of the proposals to charge for children or take
away exemptions for large families fades upon close examination. But
it would still be worthwhile to take the applause for large families out of
the tax laws. An amendment to the tax laws must be couched in terms
of fairness to those who pay higher taxes, i.e., the childless and unmar-
ried taxpayers. For a time, tax laws may become even more complex
than they are now, as equivalent deductions are extended to childless
taxpayers. But at some time in the distant future, a campaigner may
win the presidential election on campaign promises to revise and simpli-
fy the tax structure-which would mean removing all of the subsidies.
Some may say that the "distant future" occurred during the presidential
campaign of 1976, and that simplification is just around the corner. But
113. See also Comment, supra note 6, at 211.
114. See Dileo, supra note 3, at 209-10.
115. See Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1934).
116. See Schaffer & Berman, supra note 3, at 691-96.
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it is too much to ask that a Congress that produced the prolix and
complex Tax Reform Act of 1976 turn out basic tax simplification in
the near future. In this vein, there is presented in conclusion, a modest
proposal.
In symbolic recognition of the virtues of restraint in childbearing, a
deduction is proposed for those who have successfully curbed their urge
to procreate in the past. This is similar to the Spengler proposal'11 in
that the deduction can be viewed as a governmental contribution in lieu
of the support that children might otherwise provide in their parents' old
age. It can be modest in amount to avoid great revenue impact,
because its value is to be merely symbolic. In any event, it will be a
reallocation of burdens, so it could be keyed to a time for selective tax
cuts.
The deduction would be allowed, for example, at age forty-five for
those with no children, age fifty-five for those with one child, and age
sixty-five for those with two children. Further delays at ten year
intervals for each additional child will make the deduction academic for
those with more than three children.
There will be problems based upon determining the number of
children a taxpayer has had, whether the deduction should be based
upon children surviving, and whether in a split family both father and
mother are to be denied the deduction at the earliest age. It could be
keyed to past dependency exemptions allowable, e.g., a half-year delay
for each year of such exemption-a factor militating against simplicity
but tending towards equity.
The proposal may be no more or less fanciful than any other. The
"child restraint deduction" may even have some utility, if such tamper-
ings ever do.
117. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
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